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 ABSTRACT  
 
 
This paper utilises a new critical juncture framework to help us determine whether changes to 
Mexican macroeconomic policy in the early 1980s, and Brazilian macroeconomic policy at the 
turn of the century, were clean breaks with the past, or continuations of previously established 
policy pathways.  The framework consists of three elements, which must be identified in 
sequence in order to declare, with some certainty, if an event was a critical juncture.  These are 
crisis, ideational change, and radical policy change. 
 
Keywords: Mexico, Brazil, economic, critical, juncture. 
 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 
Crises are often blamed for bringing about abrupt institutional/policy changes (Mahoney, 2000; 
Pierson, 2000; Gorges, 2001).  Crises are seen as providing political leaders with the opportunity 
to implement new plans.  The result is a tendency to link economic crises with radical 
institutional/policy changes.  However, this fails to take account of, nor does it attempt to 
2 
 
understand, those instances where an economic crisis, instead of being followed by radical policy 
change, is followed by extant policy continuity.  Blaming crises for radical policy change misses 
subtleties at the heart of the process.    
Despite the importance applied to critical junctures in our perception of change, our 
understanding of the concept is limited due to the limited attention that has been paid to it 
(Pierson, 2004).  Critical junctures have been examined using unwieldy frameworks (Collier and 
Collier, 1991; Mohoney, 2001), counterfactual analysis (Fearon, 1996), and case specific criteria 
(Hogan, 2005; 2006).  This has restricted our ability to identify and compare critical junctures, 
and to differentiate them from other forms of change, such as incremental change, that over 
decades might transform a policy or institution. 
Just because a crisis comes before a radical policy change does not indicate a cause and 
effect relationship, which scholars (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000; 
Gorges, 2001) have sometimes assumed.  The critical juncture framework developed by Hogan 
and Doyle (2007; 2008) contends that such a linkage is an oversimplification, failing to take 
account of the specific circumstances involved.  It argues that an economic crisis is a necessary, 
but insufficient, condition for radical economic policy change.  According to the framework, a 
critical juncture consists of crisis, ideational change, and radical policy change.  The framework 
rests upon the hypothesis that a crisis induced consolidation of a new idea – replacing an extant 
idea – leads to significant policy change.  Thus, the framework should be capable of explaining 
why certain crises lead to critical junctures in policies, whereas others do not, as the 
differentiating factor between them is ideational change.  The framework contends that without 
ideational change the level of policy change, in response to a crisis, can be of the first or second 
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order, but not the third.1  Ideational change is the intermediating variable between crisis and 
policy change.   
Figure 1 Critical Juncture Approach  
 
 
This framework has been used to examine change in macroeconomic policy in America, Britain, 
Ireland, and Sweden.  Here, the macroeconomic difficulties affecting Mexico at the start of the 
1980s, and Brazil at the turn of the 21st century, are examined and compared using this 
framework.  Our objective is to discover if the economic difficulties affecting both countries 
constituted crises, and, if so, did these lead to changes in the ideas underpinning their 
macroeconomic policies, and the subsequent nature of Mexican and Brazilin macroeconomic 
policies.  Using Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework will provide an insight into the 
mechanics of policy change, and the value of employing a critical junctures framework that 
produces comparable results, even thought the cases selected for examination are separated 
politically, geographically, and temporally.  The framework’s applicability across countries, and 
time, is of particular value, as it makes the concept of the critical juncture less nebulous and case 
specific, thereby enhancing its significance to our understanding of policy change.  Was 
macroeconomic policy in Mexico in the early 1980s, and in Brazil in the early 2000s, a 
continuation of, or a break with, the past?   
 
Section 2: The Characteristics and Uses of the Critical Junctures Approach 
 
Critical junctures are seen as branching points that set processes change in motion.  The literature 
sees critical junctures resulting in the adoption of an institutional arrangement from among 
                                                 
1
 Borrows from Hall’s (1993) concept of first, second and third order change. 
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alternatives (Mahoney, 2000: 512).  Thereafter, the pathway established funnels units in a 
particular direction (Mahoney, 2003: 53).   
For some, a critical juncture constitutes a brief period in which one direction or another is 
taken, while for others, it is an extended period of reorientation (Mahoney, 2001).  The concept 
has been employed in comparative politics.  Collier and Collier (1991) used a critical juncture 
framework in their analyses of labour movements in Latin America.  Mahoney (2001) employed 
a similar framework examining the liberalisation of Central America.  For Collier and Collier 
(1991) and Mahoney (2001) critical junctures took decades to occur.  Hogan (2005; 2006) 
questioned whether these periods were instances of incremental change, labeled by Streeck and 
Thelen (2005) periods of conversion.  
In relation to short term change, Garrett and Lange (1995: 628) showed that electoral 
landslides created critical junctures by producing mandates for policy change.  Casper and 
Taylor (1996) employed the concept in analysing liberalisation of authoritarian regimes, while 
Hogan’s (2005; 2006) remoulded the framework to examine change in trade union influence 
over public policy.  Karl (1997) employed the concept of critical junctures in analyzing how 
“petro-states” became locked into problematic development pathways, while Gal and Bargal 
(2002) used critical junctures to analyze occupational welfare in Israel.  Flockhart (2005) used 
critical junctures to explain the gap between Danish voters and their politician’s attitudes 
towards the European Union (EU). 
 The literature is inconsistent in how it quantifies, and differentiates, critical juncutres 
from other forms of change.  However, the fact that Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework 
is rigorous may resolve this.  It should produce consistent findings, enabling us to determine 
whether the changes to Mexican and Brazilian economic policy constituted critical junctures.    
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Section 3: The Countries Selected for Examination 
 
Through studying politics on a comparative basis we can discover trends, and achieve an 
understanding of broader characteristics (Blondel, 1995: 3).  The value of comparison is the 
perspective it offers, and its goal of building a body of increasingly complete explanatory theory 
(Mahler, 1995).  Comparative historical analyses, concerning different time periods, is also 
beneficial (Lieberman, 2001: 5).  To provide different, but comparable cases, we draw our case 
selections from two countries, separated by two decades.   
 Mexico in (1981-1983), and Brazil (1999-2003), are examined based upon the criteria of 
“most similar” and “most different.”  The selection requirements for “most similar” are that both 
countries are Latin America states, in the time periods examined are democratic, and are 
presidential federal republics.  Both countries’ economies are amongst the world’s largest.  In 
terms of differences, Brazil was colonised by the Portuguese, while Mexico was colonised by the 
Spanish, giving them different cultural heritages.  Brazil is almost 5 times the size of Mexico, 
has twice the population, but has a shorter history as a democracy.  In the early 1980s Mexico 
had import substitution policies (Panizza, 2005), while by the late 1990s Brazil was operating a 
free market approach (Panizza, 2005).  Their similarities will ensure ‘the contexts of analysis are 
analytically equivalent, to a significant degree,’ while their differences will place the ‘parallel 
processes of change in sharp relief’ (Collier, 1997: 4).  
 
Section 4: Policy Change and Identification 
 
Policy change must be seen in the context of societal and political change.  Utilizing Hogan and 
Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework, we examine macroeconomic policy change in discrete stages.  
The first examines the economy to see if it was in crisis.  A crisis implies prevailing policy 
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cannot be sustained without deterioration (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995: 14).  To test for 
economic crisis we develop observable implications.   The framework’s second stage tests for 
ideational change.  New ideas can change the policy environment (Pemberton, 2000: 790).  But, 
how ideas influence policy is something theorists have long grappled with (Taylor, 1993).  
Where do ideas come from?  How do they relate to failing policies?  Why do ideas underlying a 
failing policy sometimes change, resulting in policy change, whereas other times they remain 
unaltered?  To answer this, a second set of observables, based on Legro (2000), are set out.  The 
framework’s third stage tests for policy change.  These observables are based upon Hall (1993), 
tying together the concepts of policy change, societal learning, and the state.   
 
Section 4:1 Testing for a Macroeconomic Crisis 
 
Scholars regularly ‘agree that severe recessions make significant structural changes possible as 
they render politics highly fluid’ (Garrett, 1993: 522).  However, economic crises are rare, 
rendering definition difficult (Yu et al., 2006: 439).  How do we identify a crisis?  For Stone 
(1989: 299) a situation does not become a problem until it is controllable.  But, it is controllable 
it must be measurable, otherwise how would we know if we are controlling it?  Thus, even 
economic crises must be quantifiable. 
Berg and Pattillo (1999) advocated examining individual variables when quantifying 
currency crises.  Pei and Adesnik (2000: 138-139) developed a range of criteria for identifying 
macroeconomic crises: annual inflation greater than 15 percent, stagnant gross domestic product 
(GDP), and historians and other analysts’ descriptions of deterioration in economic 
circumstances.  Frankel and Rose (1996: 351) define a “macroeconomic crisis” as a stagnant 
economy, where investment is in decline, inflation, interest rates, and unemployment are above 
15 percent, and actors perceive an economic crisis.  For Solimano (2005: 76) a macro-economic 
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crisis can be identified through indicators and perceptions of growth, inflation, employment 
creation, and poverty. 
We seek to identify macro-economic crises through quantitative and qualitative 
measures.  Defining anything as a crisis, including a macro-economic downturn, requires 
subjective and objective deliberations (Pei and Adesnik, 2000: 139).  Consequently, González 
(2005: 93) suggests adopting a multifaceted approach.  Agents must diagnose, and impose on 
others, their notion of a crisis before collective action to resolve uncertainty can take meaningful 
form (Blyth, 2002: 9).   
We use a range of observable implications which seek to identify change in nominal 
economic performance, as well as in perceptions of economic health (Hogan and Doyle, 2007; 
2008). 
O1. If GDP growth was stagnant/negative, the economy may have been in crisis. 
 
O2. If debt as a percentage of GNI was above 100 percent, the economy may have been in 
crisis. 
 
O3. If inflation was above 15 percent (Pei and Adesnik, 2000), the economy may have been 
in crisis. 
 
O4. If the interest rate was above 15 percent, the economy may have been in crisis. 
 
O5. If unemployment was above 15 percent, the economy may have been in crisis. 
 
O6. If opinion polls find the public regard the economic in crisis, the economy may have been in 
crisis. 
 
O7. If the media regarded the economy in crisis, the economy may have been in crisis. 
   
O8. If economic and political commentators regarded the economy in crisis, the economy may 
have been in crisis. 
 
O9. If the central bank regarded the economy in crisis, the economy may have been in crisis. 
 
O10. If both domestic and international organisations monitoring economic performance 
regarded the economy in crisis, then the economy may have been in crisis. 
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O11. If elected representatives regarded the economy in crisis, the economy may have been in 
crisis. 
 
O12. If government pronouncements on the economy were consistent with a crisis management 
approach, the economy may have been in crisis. 
 
 
The Mexican Economy in the Early 1980s  
After 1945 Mexico sought growth through import substitution (Narula, 2002).  Industries 
developed behind import quotas.  This increased the country’s international trade, decreasing its 
foreign dependence.  The model succeeded as there was demand for Mexican raw materials.  
However, it created a private sector dependent upon state protection (Hernandez, 2008)2. 
President Echeverria’s (1970-1976) administration allowed fiscal and monetary discipline 
collapse (Serra-Puche, 2008)3, marking the exhaustion of the policy of “stabilising development” 
(Narula, 2002).  Rubio4 (2008) blames the failures of stabilising development on falling 
agricultural exports, rapid population growth, and middle class disillusionment with its inability 
to express itself in a one party (Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)) dominated culture.  
However, once oil reserves were discovered by Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), the state oil 
company, in the late 1970s (Calderón-Madrid, 1997), the hope was that oil revenue would 
stabilise the economy.  However, this only circumvented the dangers of immediate crisis, 
without resolving the economy’s structural problems (Nelson, 1990: 95).  This was evidence of 
the temporary solutions often sought by Mexico’s political elite (Tournaud, 2008).5 
                                                 
2
 Luis Miguel Beristain Hernandez, PhD in Administrative Sciences.  Business and Politics professor, Director of 
Professional Development, Enterprise Development and Social Development at ITESM (Interviewed July 2008). 
3Jaime Serra Puche, PhD in Economics. Mexican Politician. Secretary of Commerce and Industry in 1988; 
Treasury Secretary in 1994; and Mexico’s representative in NAFTA negotiations in early 1990s.  (Interviewed June 
2008). 
4Luis Rubio, PhD in Political Science. Mexican writer on politics, and economics. (Interviewed July 2008). 
5
 Nicolas Foucras Tournaud, PhD in Political Science. Head of the Political Science department, ITEMS (Instituto 
Tecnológico y De Estudios Superiores de Monterrey) Campus Monterrey. (Interviewed August 2008). 
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 Once the country became a net petroleum exporter pressure grew to expand public 
spending.  The number of state owned enterprises quadrupled to 1,200 (Calderón-Madrid, 1997).  
Under President Portillo (1976-1982) expenditure outstripped petroleum revenues and an 
anaemic taxation system (Solís, 1981).  As a consequence, the economy began to overheat 
(Appendix A).  To finance these projects Mexico borrowed $78bn. by 1981 (Alarcon and 
McKinley, 1992).  The state’s share of fixed capital formation increased to 50 percent 
(Fitzgerald, 1978: 277).  As inflation surpassed 25 percent the peso became overvalued, and the 
competiveness of exports, apart from oil, diminished (McCaughan, 1993).  ‘The merchandise 
trade balance deteriorated’ as ‘imports rose while nonoil exports earning stagnated’ (Nash, 1991: 
494). 
Mexico was poorly positioned when oil prices fell in response to a weakening world 
economy in the early 1980s.6  Compounding matters, PEMEX and the Secretaría de 
Programación y Presupuesto (SPP), declared oil production would be insufficient to reactivate 
the economy.7  Recession in the US reduced demand for Mexican goods, while a sharp increase 
in interest rates there reduced the money supply, and put pressure on Mexico’s debt servicing, as 
US banks had lent the country $25 billion.  Servicing Mexico’s debt reached $16 billion, more 
than its revenues from oil (Cornelius, 1985: 89).  ‘Collapsing oil prices and rising international 
interest rates erased Mexico’s prosperity’ (Starr, 2006: 53).   
By 1982, as confidence in the economy waned, Mexicans began converting pesos to 
dollars at 25 billion pesos a day.8  The gravity of the situation came to international attention on 
August 13, 1982, when:   
                                                 
6
 Time Magazine, 22 February, 1982.   
7
 Magazine Nexos, Sociedad, Ciencia y Literatura,. January, 1982.  “De Díaz Mirón a Díaz Serrano”. 
8
 Time Magazine, 30 August, 1982. 
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The government fired the shot heard around the world, announcing that it could 
not meet interest payments coming due within the next few days and initiating 
negotiations for bridge loans and rescheduling agreements with the US Treasury, 
the IMF, and the private commercial banks (Nelson, 1990: 97).  
Mexico’s economic indicators pointed towards crisis (APPENDIX A) (Dornbusch and Edwards, 
1991).  GDP contracted by 0.6 percent in 1982 and 4.2 percent in 1983, while the inflation 
reached 58.92 percent in 1982 (Katz, 1994).  Output fell in all industries,9 unemployment jumped 
towards 15 percent,10 while more than 20 million people, half the workforce, were 
underemployed (Cornelius, 1985: 92).  Compounding matters, US banks stopped lending to 
Mexican companies as they already owed US$600 million in interest.11  The budget deficit stood 
at 16.5 percent of GDP.12 
 In 1983 inflation reached triple digits, the national debt continued to rise, and the level of 
capital formation slackened (Appendix A).  According to Edwards (1995: 17) this was the worst 
crisis to hit Mexico since the Great Depression.  The Third World Magazine13, Gestión y 
Estrategia14, and Time Magazine15 referred to Mexico’s difficulties as a crisis.  Mexican 
economic magazine Proceso regarded 1982 as Mexico’s worst recession.16  The Third World 
Magazine argued the country was effectively bankrupt.17  Minimum wages were insufficient to 
meet the needs of most Mexicans (Lustig, 1986).  Opinion polls found great scepticism 
concerning the economy (Basañez, 1985). 
                                                 
9
 ibid. 
10
 ibid, 20 December, 1982. 
11
 ibid, 1 January, 1983. 
12
 ibid., 20 December, 1982. 
13
 The Third World Magazine, October, 1983. IMF: quick fix- slow poison,  
14
 Gestión y Estrategia, Calderón, Gilberto, July, 1991.  Privatización de la Banca en México.  
15
 Time Magazine, 15 July, 1987.  ‘Last Bow of the Inflation Tamer’. 
16
  Proceso, Mexican economic and political magazine (1982) La Devaluación de 1982. No. 306, September 11th. 
17
 The Third World Magazine, December, 1983.  
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 During 1982 the peso was devaluated twice in order to increase exports (Katz, 1994), but 
the economy could not hold onto dollars.  New short term loans were taken to counteract capital 
flight, but did nothing (Jiménez, 2006).  Banco de Mexico’s reserves dried up in a matter of 
weeks.18   In his Sixth Annual Presidential Report, Portillo stated that the economy was 
experiencing the worst crisis in its history.19 
 Bailey (1980: 54) identified trends that produced economic panic: excessive government 
outlays; $15 billion in short-term loans which funded capital flight; an overvalued peso; and 
dollarization.  Despite growing by 8 percent annually between 1978 and 1981, by the end of 
1982, Mexico faced one of the severest crises in its history (Barker and Brailovsky, 1983). 
 
The Brazilian Economy in the Late 1990s 
Brazil undertook an inflation stabilization programme in 1994, the Plano Real (Netto, 1999), 
pegging the real to the dollar.  Inflation fell from 50 percent per month in 1995 to 3.2 percent 
annually by 1998 (Appendix B).  However, there was substantial exchange rate appreciation, 
making Brazilian goods relatively more expensive, contributing to a current account deficit by 
1997 (Bulmer-Thomas, 1999: 730). 
 Interest rates doubled as the repercussions from the Asian financial crisis reached Brazil, 
indicating the fragility of its situation (Heymann, 2001: 16).  Simultaneously, inflation began to 
rise, reaching 5 percent by 1999.  Nevertheless, the authorities promised a new assault on fiscal 
problems, now aggravated by higher interest on government debt.  However, the government, 
with an eye to the 1998 elections, failed to make good on its commitments, and the budget deficit 
grew to 8.4 percent of GDP. 
                                                 
18
 Latin America Regional Reports, 13 August, 1982, p. 1. 
19
 Sixth Annual Presidential Report of President López Portillo, September 1st, 1982. 
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 Following the Asian crisis, and Russian bond default, investors became risk averse 
(Kaminsky et al., 2003: 51), reflecting the downgrading of Brazil’s credit rating.20  As $30 
billion fled the country in September 1998, the central bank raised interest rates to 43 percent.  
By November President Cardoso, safely re-elected, announced measures to slash the deficit, and 
right the economy.21   
However, the real came under speculative attack in November 1998.  To defend the 
currency, the central bank pushed interest rates to 50 percent,22 increasing the cost of servicing 
public and private debt to the extent that investors became convinced a default was inevitable.  
High interest rates, instead of slowing the tide of dollars leaving Brazil, accelerated the process.  
The governor of Minas Gerais’s announcement of a 90 day moratorium on debt repayments to 
the federal government23, and fears that the governors of Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul 
would do likewise, threatened the country’s fiscal integrity (Rothkopf, 1999: 91), sending 
investors fleeing the Brazilian capital markets (Cattaneo, 2001: 228).  With the Brazilian central 
bank losing $2 billion a day,24 the World Bank initiated crisis talks. 
A $41 billion IMF-led rescue package was arranged.25  But, President Cardoso was 
unable to get an appropriate budget (tax increases/spending cuts) approved.26  The possibility of 
default arose.  The upper classes, convinced devaluation of the real inevitable, began 
withdrawing investment from Brazil.  The fall in gross capital formation for 1998 reflected this 
capital flight (Table 2).  As foreign direct investment (FDI) went elsewhere the prospects for the 
                                                 
20
 Brazil’s rating in 1999; Moody: B2, S&P: -B; Fitch: -BB. See Moody's Investor's Service; Standard & Poor's; 
Fitch IBCA; at http://www.latin-focus.com/latinfocus/countries/brazil.  
21
 The Economist, 21 November, 1998, p. 23. 
22
 The Independent, 4 December 1999, p. 18.  
23
 Business and Finance, 25 January, 1999, p. 36. 
24
 The Evening Standard, 15 January, 1999, p. 41. 
25
 ibid., 30 January, 1999, p. S12. 
26
 The New York Times, 28 February, 1999, p. 1.  
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economy, and the value of the real, grew bleak.  Unemployment hit 9 percent by the end of 
1998. 
 Despite pledges not to do so,27 the exchange rate band was widened to accommodate 
devaluation in January 1999 (Roett and Crandall, 1999: 279).  While the real/dollar exchange 
rate, which had been close to parity, plummeted to two for one by February.  Debt services as a 
percentage of exports reached 117 percent by 1999.28  Devaluation also put pressure on the 
central bank as its diminishing foreign currency reserves were the only thing preventing further 
devaluation.29  However, devaluation did not stop the haemorrhage of dollars.  
 On the day of devaluation, the Sao Paulo stock exchange fell 10 percent and within a few 
weeks this policy collapsed, forcing the resignation of a second central bank governor.  Arminio 
Fraga, the new governor, floated the currency,30 but the country plunged into recession with 
declines in industrial output and GNP.31  The percentage of the population below the poverty line 
surpassed 25 percent.32  The New York Times – observing that Brazil was in crisis, with capital 
fleeing, and state governments defying the central authority33 – predicted a debt default.34  Real 
GDP was stagnant throughout 1998 and 1999 (Appendix B), while GDP per capita fell by 1.39 
and 0.7 percent in the same period.35  However, the inflation did not surpass 7 percent.36   
 ‘Many commentators assumed Brazil would have to restructure its debt (a euphemism for 
default)’ (Bulmer-Thomas, 1999: 736).  Summers (2000: 5) regarded this as one of the major 
international financial crises of the 1990s.  By early March 1999 the Brazilian central bank was 
                                                 
27
 The Washington Post, 11 February, 1999, p. A31. 
28
 The Independent, 14 January, 1999, p. 1.  
29
 The Daily Mail, 15 January, 1999, p. 65. 
30
 Financial Times, 4 March, 1999, p. 6.   
31
 Business and Finance, 19 August, 1999, p. 10.  
32
 Brazil, http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=br&v=69 
33
 The New York Times, 31 January, 1999, p. 16. 
34
 ibid., 31 January, 1999, p. 16. 
35Data Gob, Governance Indicators Database, http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/  
36
 The Economic Intelligence Unit – Country Report: Brazil, March 2003. 
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still struggling to prop up the real.37 According to Summers and Williamson (2001: 56) at the 
heart of the Brazilian crisis was that its pegged exchange rate lacking sufficient 
institutionalisation of the measures necessary to make the peg stick.  
 
Table 1 – The Identification of Macroeconomic Crisis 
The Observable Implications  Mexico 
1981-1983 
Brazil 
1999-2003 
O1. Was GDP growth was stagnant? X X 
O2. Was total debt as a percentage of GNI was above 100%? X  
O3. Was annual inflation was above 15%? X  
O4. Was the annual interest rate was above 15%? X X 
O5. Was the annual unemployment rate was above 15%? X  
O6. Did opinion polls find the public regarded the economic in crisis? X X 
O7. Did the media regard the economy in crisis? X X 
O8. Did economic and political commentators regard the economy in crisis? X X 
O9. Did the central bank regard the economy as in crisis? X X 
O10. Did domestic/ international organisations regard the economy as in 
crisis? 
X X 
O11. Did elected representatives regard the economy as in crisis? X X 
O12. Were gov pronouncements on the economy were consistent with a crisis 
management approach? 
X X 
Economic Crisis  X X 
 
According to the framework Mexico experienced a macroeconomic crisis, as it satisfied all 
observable implications (Table 1).  The economy was stagnant, debt out of control, inflation and 
interest rates very high, and the general perception amongst politicians, economic commentators, 
and the media, was of crisis.   Although Brazil (1998-2000) satisfied only 70 percent of the 
observables (Table 1), we argue that it experienced an economic crisis.  This is because its 
economy was stagnant, investment was declining, and the media, public, and economic 
commentators, regarded the economy in a crisis.   
In terms of severity, Mexico’s crisis was more acute than Brazil’s.  This is clear from 
developments in Mexico at the time, and is also borne out by all of the above observables 
pointed to a crisis there.  Thus, although both states experienced economic crises during the 
                                                 
37
 The Times, 3 March, 1999, p. 12. 
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years in question, their severity differed.  Holding with Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) critical 
juncture framework, which argues that a crisis induced consolidation of a new idea – replacing 
an extant idea – can lead to significant policy change, the next section will see if ideas 
underlying the economic policies in both states changed at these times. 
 
Section 4.2: Testing for Ideational Change 
Previous policies can be discredited due to their implication in, or inability to right, a crisis 
(Levy, 1994).  Although economic crises can have great impact they will not determine policy, 
whose formulation is ‘centred in domestic political and ideational processes’ (Golob, 2003: 375).  
Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework contends that significant policy change depends 
upon actors reaching consensus upon, and consolidating around, a new set of ideas.  This 
corresponds to McNamara’s (1998: 4-5) argument that actors utilize new ideas to chart policy 
strategy.  ‘Ideas facilitate the reduction of … barriers by acting as coalition-building resources 
among agents who attempt to resolve the crisis’ (Blyth, 2002: 37).  Ideas are the casual 
mechanisms of change in a critical juncture (Golob, 2003).  Thus, ideational change stands 
between a crisis and policy change. 
Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework contends that new ideas are introduced by 
three groups of change agents.  Combinations of these agents constitute a policy network (Hall, 
1993).  The most important are what Dahl (1961) termed ‘political entrepreneurs’.  Political 
entrepreneurs ‘exploit moments of instability’ and ‘invest resources in the creation of a new 
policy, a new agency, or new forms of collective action’ (Sheingate, 2003: 188-190).  In a crisis, 
a political leader, usually an opposition leader, will seek new ideas to rectify the ills of an 
existing policy paradigm.  The second group are Kingdon’s (1995: 179-183) ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’.  These are agents who spread ideas to replace the current paradigm.  They may 
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be civil servants, technocrats, academics, economists and interest groups.  The final group of 
change agents consists of outside influences: the media, the OECD, IMF and the World Bank.  
They critique an existing economic paradigm, advocating a new one.  Both policy entrepreneurs 
and outside influences are responsible for producing ideas, but, political entrepreneurs introduce 
ideas into the policy process. 
 According to Legro’s (2000: 419) two-stage model of ideational change, if agents agree 
the existing paradigm is deficient and should be replaced, the first stage – ideational collapse – 
has occurred.  These are the observables for ideational collapse: 
 
Ideational Collapse 
 
O1. The media questions the efficacy of the current model.  
O2. Opposition political parties critique the current model and propose alternative ideas – 
at election time their platform will be built around these alternatives. 
O3. Civil society organizations, e.g. labour unions, employer organizations, consumer 
groups etc. critique the current model 
O4. Widespread public dissatisfaction with the current paradigm, observable through 
opinion polls, protests etc. 
O5. External/international organizations critique the current model and/or actively 
disseminate alternative ideas. 
Change agents in the form of policy entrepreneurs, and outside influences, propose a solutions.  
However, ‘even when ideational collapse occurs, failure to reach consensus on a replacement 
could still produce continuity, as society reflexively re-embraces the old orthodoxy’ (Legro, 
2000: 424).  The crucial issue is reaching consensus on a new set of ideas.  If consensus is 
achieved it marks the second stage of Legro’s model – consolidation – agents coordinating a 
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replacement set of ideas.  This can be seen in political entrepreneurs consolidating innovations 
by combining a mixture of interests to produce a winning coalition (Sheingate 2003: 192-193).  
Oliver and Pemberton (2004) identified this process as “policy learning”.  Below are the 
observables for new ideational consolidation. 
New Ideational Consolidation 
O6. Clear alternative ideas, developed by policy entrepreneurs, are evident. 
O7. A clear change agent (political entrepreneur) injecting new ideas into the policy arena 
is evident. 
O8. The Political Entrepreneur combines a mixture of interests to produce consensus 
around a replacement paradigm. 
Policies are protected by underlying ideas.  The greater the consensus encompassing an idea the 
more protected the policies derived from it.  Protected policies represent continuity, whereby 
once a policy has become institutionally embedded, ‘policy-making becomes possible only in 
terms of these ideas’ (Blyth, 2001: 4).  Referring to policies as protected is similar to Golob’s 
notion of ‘policy frontiers’ (2003: 363). 
 
The Ideas Underlying Mexican Macroeconomic Policy 
Populist-redistributive models were implemented by PRI presidents between 1934 and 1976 
(Sandersen, 1983: 319).  When Portillo came to office he was forced to contemplate reduced 
expenditure due to the oil crisis (Woodhead, 1980).  However, the discovery of oil changed 
everything, with Portillo adopting a patronage model embracing industrialisation and expansive 
state expenditure (Bailey, 1980).  This produced high growth, however, the economy remained 
vulnerable. 
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Rather than pay the political price that sweeping redistributive policies-especially tax 
reform-would have entailed, the Portillo administration (1976-1982) sought to 
expand the entire economic pie and increase the role of the state in the economy, as 
banker, entrepreneur, and employer (Cornelius, 1985: 88). 
Despite oil revenues, the economy became fuelled on borrowing and declining real wages.38  
However, once oil prices fell, and interest rates spiked, Mexico faced the prospect of debt 
default.  The ideas underlying extant economic policy underwent a rethink.  By mid March 1982, 
President Portillo’s administration introduced an economic stabilization plan.39 
During the 1982 presidential election all contenders focused on the crisis.  Miguel De La 
Madrid, a fiscal conservative, was the PRI’s presidential candidate.40  He was ‘among the leaders 
of the conservative faction based in the treasury’ (Nelson, 1990: 98).  Shifts in a more 
conservative direction within the PRI led to De La Madrid’s selection (Villegas, 1981).  Mexican 
society was in turmoil, and free market supporters wanted a president who would support the 
rights of private property (Luna et al., 1987).  The choice of De La Madrid constituted a rupture 
with the PRI’s revolutionary ideology (Cárdenas, 2008)41. 
During the campaign, De La Madrid stressed the differences between his proposed 
government and that of Portillo.  “Crises come about because the government tries to consolidate 
all interests at the same time...” declared De La Madrid.42  His proposed government would 
mobilise resources to change the economy’s direction.43  ‘In the post-1982 environment, policy 
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options and instruments appeared limited [for Mexico], which as a debtor was subject to the 
conditionality imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’ (Golob, 2003: 375).   
In his inauguration address De La Madrid declared that a new economic approach was 
needed.44  Sources of external finance dried up in the aftermath of the crisis, while oil revenues 
remained stagnant (Hernandez, 2008).  Locked into a harsh IMF bailout, negotiated by the 
outgoing administration, De La Madrid presented a programme for policy change.45  To maintain 
economic, political, and social order, a break with the past was required.  Acting as a political 
entrepreneur, De La Madrid selected his ministers from the conservative wing of the PRI 
(Nelson, 1990: 98).  He wanted to take policy to the right, stabilizing and opening the economy 
(Lustig, 1992: 28).  The new administration prioritized integration into the world economy by 
attracting FDI; and focusing on high tech industries.  
 
The Ideas Underlying Brazilian Macroeconomic Policy 
 
The state played an important role in Brazil’s development (Goldstein, 1999: 675).  After the 
first oil crisis the Geisel administration implemented an expansionary growth strategy (Pinheiro 
and Giambiagi, 1999: 7).  However, the rising nation debt burdened the economy, and as interest 
rates rose servicing this debt became problematic (Baer, 2001).  GDP growth stagnated to 1.2 
percent per annum during the 1980s (Berg et al., 2006: 46).  After a half century of import-
substitution industrialisation the economy was opened in 1990 under President Collor (Berg et 
al., 2006: 49).   
 The 2002 election saw widespread discontent with the market model due to the Real 
Crisis and persistent indigence (Samuels, 2006).  Luiz Inácio Lula de Silva and the Partido dos 
Trabalhadores (PT) initially contested the election attacking the market-friendly policies of 
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Cardoso.  The PT’s program for government, Concepção e Diretrizes do Programa de Governo 
do PT para o Brasil emphasized state intervention and poverty reduction.46  Public opinion 
echoed these sentiments.47 
Following market jitters concerning statist policies, Lula announced he would not reverse 
capitalist reforms, but would seek to make them fairer.48  Market fears were exacerbated by the 
meltdown of the Argentine economy, and worries that Brazil might also default.49  Investor 
anxiousness sent the value of the Real tumbling again.50  In response, the PT released a toned 
down Programa de Governo do PT.51  Just before the election, to assuage investors confidence, 
Lula released Carta ao Povo Brasileiro (Letter to the People of Brazil).  It stated that he was not 
going to implement the leftist ideology of the PT if elected (Flynn, 2005: 1246).  It suggested he 
would seek to ensure economic stability, and did not criticize free market policies.52  Lula was 
cognisant of his impact upon the market, and ‘that economic autarchy [was] not an option for an 
export-driven economic powerhouse.’53  He recognised that a program that might result in 
default would make it difficult for him to implement his social policies.54   
Ideational contestation occurred, but Lula failed to present an alternative to an open 
economy.  Recognising economic realities, he moderated his rhetoric, and moved to the right.55  
Closing the economy, and renationalizing firms, would scare investor (Weyland, 2004: 144).  
Throughout the campaign Lula sought to ‘reassure foreign investors and financial markets that 
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he [was] not a reckless Marxist firebrand’.56  His only sop to the past was to call for an end to 
outright privatisations (unremarkable, as little was left to sell).  Lula came to recognise the need 
for growth within the context of the extant economic regime, in order to achieve his social 
agenda.57  No alternative idea to the open economy was consolidated.   
 
Table 2 – The Identification of Ideational Change  
The Observable Implications Mexico Brazil 
 
1981-1983 1999-2003 
Ideational Collapse    
O1. Media questioning efficacy of current model. X  
O2. Opposition parties critique current model and propose alternative ideas – at 
elections their platform are built around these alternative ideas. 
X X 
O3. Civil society organisations critique the current model.  X X 
O4. Widespread public dissatisfaction with current paradigm, observable through 
opinion polls, protests etc. 
X X 
O5. External or international organisations critique current model or, actively 
disseminate alternative economic ideas. 
X  
 Y Y 
New Ideational Consolidation   
O6. Clear alternative ideas are evident X  
O7. A clear change agent (political entrepreneur) to inject these new ideas into 
policy arena is evident 
X  
O8. Political Entrepreneur combines a mixture of interests to produce consensus 
around a replacement paradigm 
X  
Adoption of New Idea Y N 
 
In relation to Mexico, see from Table 2 that all observable implications concerning extant 
ideational collapse, and new consolidation, were satisfied.  Vast expenditure, based on the belief 
that oil revenues could support rapid industrialisation, led the country to the brink of bankruptcy.  
This resulted in widespread criticism of the economic policy of import substitution, and as a 
result the ideas underpinning it collapsed.  De La Madrid, acting as a political entrepreneur, 
championed a new set of ideas on opening the economy.   
For Brazil, we see from Table 2 that three of the observable implications concerning 
ideational collapse were satisfied, while no observable for new ideational consolidation was. 
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Although the free market model was challenged in Brazil, no viable alternative was presented.  
Lula’s opposition to economic openness mellowed as he came to recognise that turning his back 
on international finance/markets would make it impossible to achieve his social policies. 
 Thus, although both countries experienced economic crises, only in Mexico did the ideas 
on how to manage the economy change.  There, changes agents, led by a political entrepreneur in 
De La Madrid, consolidated around a replacement set of idea.  In Brazil, a political entrepreneur, 
willing to take policy in a new direction, was absent.    
Next we examine both countries for changes in economic policy.  Based on the results so 
far, Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework leads us to anticipate finding radical economic 
policy change in Mexico, due to ideational change, but not in Brazil, due to the absence of 
ideational change.   
 
Section 4.3: Identification of Policy Change  
 
McNamara (1998) argues that new ideas change the wider policy environment.  The level of 
policy change depends upon the preceding variables, but is also central to determining if there 
was a critical juncture.  Based on Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) framework we hypothesise 
that once there is political entrepreneur led consolidation around a new set of ideas policy change 
should follow.  The observable implications are based upon Hall’s (1993) concepts of first, 
second, and third order change.  Hall (1993: 291) argued that exogenous shocks, and policy 
failures, discredit the old paradigm, leading to a re-examination of the belief systems through 
which that policy was created – a paradigmatic, or third order, change.  The observables set out 
below enable us identify, and differentiate, normal and fundamental shifts in policy.  They also 
incorporate the notion of swift and enduring change (Hogan, 2005).   
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O1.  If economic policy instrument settings changed (swiftly and for longer than one 
government’s term of office) there may have been a radical change in government economic 
policy.  
O2.  If the instruments of economic policy changed (swiftly and for longer than one 
government’s term of office) there may have been a radical change in government economic 
policy.  
O3.  If the hierarchy of goals behind economic policy changed (swiftly and for longer than one 
government’s term of office) there may have been a radical change in government economic 
policy.  
 
Mexican Economic Policy 
 
The first policy response to the crisis, from Portillo’s administration, sought to keep domestic 
interest rates competitive (Looney, 1985: 112), while incentivising exports.  For decades free 
trade was ‘the policy option that dare not speak its name’ (Golob, 2003: 370).  In his inaugural 
address in December 198258 De La Madrid outlined an austerity program – Programa Inmediato 
de Reordenacion Economica (Lustig, 1998: 29).  He sent a draconian budget to Congress,59 
while the budgets of 1982-1984 represented sustained austerity (Cornelius, 1985: 117).  
 The ideas underlying state-led development, based on import substitution 
industrialisation collapsed.  The government ‘embraced an approach toward liberalisation, 
privatisation and deregulation’ (Pastor and Wise, 1997:  421).  These policies had a significant 
impact upon Mexico’s economic, and social, development (Cornelius, 1985: 84).  The new 
approach to the economy focused on using international forces as promoters of liberalisation 
(Middlebrook, 2004).  However, a major concern was Mexico’s inability to compete in foreign 
                                                 
58
 ibid. 
59
 ibid.   
24 
 
markets, and its inadequate level of saving.60  De La Madrid’s administration signalled its desire 
for new FDI by relaxing restrictive FDI laws (Cornelius, 1985: 115), permitting Mexican 
businesses form international partnerships (Tournaud, 2008). 
De La Madrid pegged the peso at a more "realistic" exchange rate, and introduced plans 
to restructure the bureaucracy.  He implemented conventional monetary and fiscal austerity, 
more extensive trade liberalisation, and a less confrontational approach to the IMF (Nelson, 
1990: 63).  ‘Acceptance of the IMF embrace [was] a major break-through’ (ISG, 1982: 1720), as 
it permitted Mexico avoid a debt moratorium (Looney, 1985: 121).  The initial adjustment 
package sought to ameliorate external debt through a reduction of government spending and 
devaluation.  This enabled Mexico reach its IMF targets for reducing the public sector deficit, 
unfortunately it had a severe recessionary impact (Pastor and Wise, 1997: 421). 
De La Madrid recognised that his administration could not rely on oil exports.61  The 
solution to financing development was sought through privatising public enterprises, of which 
1,155 were sold off (Hernandez, 2008).  De La Madrid sought to combine macroeconomic 
stabilisation and structural change, with a focus on export orientated manufacturing (Cornelius, 
1985: 110).  This was part of the objective of integrating Mexico into the world economy.   
The relationship between the private sector and the state transformed (Middlebrook, 
2004).  The neoliberal reforms made the private sector a key player in reviving the economy 
(Beristain, 2008; Tournaud, 2008).  Business organisations became engaged in debates over 
economic policy, where previously the private sector had been kept at a distance (Golob, 2003: 
371). 
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De La Madrid’s approach focused on development with a social objective, but based 
upon economic reality.62  Reform changed the country’s social ideology (Hernandez, 2008; 
Rubio, 2008).  Thus, Mexican economic history can be divided into before, and after, 1982 
(Cárdenas, 2008; Serra-Puche, 2008).  Mexico started down a different path under De La 
Madrid.  In the wake of economic crisis, and change in the ideas underlying economic policy, 
Mexico experienced a third-order macroeconomic policy change.  The market replaced 
regulation, private ownership replaced public ownership, and competition replaced protectionism 
(Pastor and Wise, 1997: 421). 
 
Brazilian Economic Policy 
 
Prior to his inauguration investors were concerned that Lula would be unable to manage the 9th 
largest economy in the world, and that his policies would be dominated by PT ideology (Flynn, 
2005: 1245).  They also feared a debt default, as in Argentina.  When Lula assumed office in 
January 2003 his appointment of Antonio Palocci, who had privatised utilities during the 1990s, 
as finance minister, and Henrique Meirelles, a free market economist, as head of the Central 
Bank, signalled his economic intentions.63  His economic staff was made up of those who had 
abandoned the populist ideas of the PT (de Castro and de Carvalho, 2003: 484).  Palocci assured 
investors that the new government would pursue fiscal restraint, low inflation and an open 
market.64 
 This assuaged fears of a lurch to the left (Edwards, 2007: 74).  The PT government, 
abandoning radicalism, maintained the free market, and budgetary stability, of its predecessors.  
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It kept a grip on the money supply and implemented severe spending cuts.65  By not taking the 
economy in a new direction, but working within established frameworks, financial markets 
gained confidence (Edwards, 2007: 73).   
 Instead of revising Brazilian macroeconomic policy the PT reversed its own position, as 
signalled in the Carta ao Povo Brasileiro.  Some saw this adoption of the economic program of 
the outgoing Cardoso administration as betrayal of the ideals upon which the PT was founded 
(Bourne, 2008: 153).  Radicalism was replaced with an orthodox approach to economic 
management.  Nevertheless, improved the exchange rate, and reduced the risks associated with 
Brazilian government bonds.  The economy responded, growing by 5 percent in 2004, up from 
0.5 percent in 2003 (Flynn, 2005: 1223), and it began to run a current account surplus.     
The president established a number of high profile posts on social policy, to help the poor 
(de Castro and de Carvalho, 2003: 484).  Lula, through medidas provisória (provisional decree) 
144/03, ensured the state electricity company, Eltrobras, and its subsidiaries Eletronorte, Chesf, 
Furnas and Eletrosul would be exempt from the Programa Nacional de Desestatização (The 
National Program of Destatisation – PND), created under Collor.66  However, José Dirceu, PT 
Chief of Staff, assured the markets that the government would not re-nationalise companies.67  
Nevertheless, there was surprise in November 2003, when the privatization of state banks, which 
Lula had opposed while waiting to assume office, proceeded.68  To encourage foreign 
investment, Lula unveiled plans for public-private partnerships.  Private firms could invest in 
state enterprises, which largely conformed with President Collor’s PND. 
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 By the end of Lula’s first term, it was clear his economic policies were a continuation of 
his predecessor’s.  Acceptance of a disciplined approach to the economy gained him the support 
of previously wary investors.69  The instrument settings of economic policy may have changed, 
but the instruments and hierarchy of goals underling economic policy remain the same.  What 
changed was ‘the PT's programmatic trajectory: the support for the financial economic sector, 
previously so harshly criticized’ (Bianchi and Braga, 2005: 1761).  
Table 3 – The Identification of Change in Government Economic Policy 
The Observable Implications  Mexico 
1981-1983 
Brazil 
1999-2003 
O1.  If industrial policy instrument settings changed there may have been a radical 
change in economic policy  
X X 
O2.  If the instruments of industrial policy changed there may have been radical 
change in economic policy  
X  
O3.  If the hierarchy of goals behind industrial policy changed there may have been a 
radical change in economic policy 
X  
Critical Juncture in Macroeconomic Policy Y N 
 
In Mexico we identified an economic crisis and ideational change.  According to the framework, 
ideational change is the differentiating factor between crises that lead to paradigmatic policy 
changes, and those that do not.  At the end of the previous section our indentifying ideational 
change in Mexico led us to anticipate a third order change in Mexican macroeconomic policy, 
which we identified in Table 3.  According to Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) three stage 
framework, the economic crisis, ideational change, and radical change in privatisation policy 
constituted a critical juncture. 
 Although there was an economic crisis in Brazil, there was no ideational change.  The 
absence of ideational change led us to anticipate the absence of radical policy change.  This was 
confirmed in Table 3.  The inability of Lula to champion an alternative set of economic idea 
resulted in only a first-order change in economic policy.  There was no critical juncture in 
Brazilian macroeconomic policy. 
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Conclusion 
 
We examined two economic upheavals, Mexico (1981-1983) and Brazil (1999-2003), to 
determine if there were critical junctures in their economic policies.  To answer this question we 
employed Hogan and Doyle’s (2007; 2008) three stage framework for identifying critical 
junctures.  Our findings were a critical juncture in Mexican economic policy, but relatively 
minor change in Brazilian economic policy. 
 According to the framework the economic malaise in Mexico (1981-1983) constituted an 
economic crisis.  The ideational foundations of extant economic policy collapsed in 1982, in the 
midst of this crisis.  Import substitution and the restrictions imposed upon FDI were perceived as 
failing.  In this context, De La Madrid assumed the role of political entrepreneur, fostering an 
alternative set of ideas on economic management.  Change agents, led by the political 
entrepreneur, consolidated around the idea of opening the economy to free trade – a reversal of 
previous policy.  De La Madrid altered the setting, instruments, and hierarchy of goals behind 
Mexican economic policy – third order policy change.  Thus, there was a crisis, ideational 
change, and radical change in economic policy, what the framework rates a critical juncture.   
 The framework also identified an economic crisis in the Brazilian economy (1999-2003).  
Although ideational collapse occurred, Lula, the likely candidate to fulfil the role of political 
entrepreneur, declined the opportunity to champion change agents’ alternative ideas on managing 
the economy.  Consequently, a coherent policy alternative was not injected into the policy 
making environment.  Instead, Lula, and his party, performed a u-turn, accepting the market 
friendly ideas of the outgoing Cardoso administration, which they had previously criticised.  In 
the absence of ideational change there was only a first order change in Brazilian economic 
policy.  
29 
 
Hogan and Doyle’s framework provided valuable insights into the policy change 
processes in both countries.  As the framework possesses a level of rigor the results it produced 
are comparable, even thought the cases examined are from different countries in different 
decades.  By situating the cases in a comparative context, the framework permits us to see how 
changes in economic policy arise.  The significance of employing this framework is that make 
the identification of what is, and what is not, a critical junctures more straightforward.   The early 
1980s witnessed a dramatic shift in Mexican economic policy, this in the wake of economic 
crisis, collapse of the ideas underlying protectionism, and consolidation of a new set of economic 
ideas under political entrepreneur De La Madrid.  In Brazil, 20 years later, the absence of a 
political entrepreneur, despite an economic crisis, ensured that an alternative set of economic 
ideas was not consolidated, leaving the foundations of extant policy intact.  The economic policy 
changes, instituted by De La Madrid, served as a cornerstone for Mexican economic policy going 
forward.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
Mexico’s Economic Indicators, 1977 – 1983  
Year Unemply 
(%) 
Inflation 
(%) 
Government 
Debt to GNI 
ratio 
Growth 
Rates in Real 
GDP 
Gross Capital 
Formation % 
of GDP 
1977 8.8 29 39.18 3.38 22.84 
1978 6.9 17.45 35.86 8.96 23.6 
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1979 5.7 18.17 32.79 9.69 25.95 
1980 4.2 26.36 30.53 9.22 25.73 
1981 4.2 27.93 32.59 8.77 25.94 
1982 6.8 58.92 53.3 -0.63 21.56 
1983 6.9 101.7 66.53 -4.2 19.77 
Source: Data Gob. [WWW document]. URL http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/index.html Mitchell, R. B.  (2007) 
International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-2005.  6th ed. Macmillan: Basingstoke; Fleck, S. And 
Sorrentino, C.  (1994) ‘Employment and Unemployment in Mexico’s Labour force’.  Monthly Labour Review, 
November (3). 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
Brazil’s Economic Indicators, 1997 – 2003  
Year Unemply 
(%) 
Inflation 
(%) 
Government 
Debt to GNI 
ratio 
Growth 
Rates in Real 
GDP 
Gross Capital 
Formation % 
of GDP 
1997 7.8 6.9 25.0 3.3 21.5 
1998 9.0 3.2 31.4 0.1 21.1 
1999 9.6 4.8 47.3 0.8 20.4 
2000 12 7 41.7 4 21.5 
2001 9.4 6.84 47.2 1.31 21.2 
2002 10.8 8.45 52.6 1.93 19.9 
2003 9.7 14.7 48.4 0.5 17.3 
Source: Data Gob. [WWW document]. URL http://www.iadb.org/DataGob/index.html Mitchell, R. B.  (2007) 
International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750-2005.  6th ed. Macmillan: Basingstoke 
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